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Improving Board Decisions: The Promise 
of Diversity 
Cindy A. Schipani† 
 
The board of directors plays an important role in United States 
corporate governance.1 Corporate law requires board members, 
particularly independent directors, to both outline corporate 
strategy and monitor the performance of management.2 Many 
boards have failed to meet this important duty. Time after time, we 
see corporate scandals escape a board’s attention. Examples of 
recent corporate scandals include: the financial crisis of 2008,3 sales 
practice abuses at Wells Fargo,4 sexual harassment at NBC 
involving Today host Matt Lauer,5 sexual misconduct by Harvey 
Weinstein of the Weinstein Company,6 cheating on auto emissions 
 
 †. Merwin H. Waterman Collegiate Professor of Business Administrations and 
Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan. The author wishes to gratefully 
acknowledge the comments of the participants of the Feminism and Corporate Law: 
Reforming Corporate Governance Roundtable hosted by the Minnesota Journal of 
Law & Inequality and the research assistance of Brooke Bonnema, J.D., and Shane 
Callaghan, J.D., University of Michigan Law School. 
 1. S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Do Independent 
Directors Curb Financial Fraud? The Evidence and Proposals for Further Reform, 93 
IND. L.J. 757, 780 (2018) [hereinafter Avci et al., Independent Directors] (noting that 
“[b]oards of directors have always been a traditional element of American corporate 
governance”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The 
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 303 (2004) (noting 
that board independence has increased in recent years). 
 2. Kelli A. Alces, Beyond the Board of Directors, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 783, 
789 (2011); Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Function of “Dysfunctional” Boards, 77 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 391, 396 (2008) (both articles noting the board’s traditional function of 
monitoring management). 
 3. Shivaram Rajgopal, Suraj Srinivasan & Yu Ting Forester Wong, Bank 
Boards: What Has Changed Since the Financial Crisis, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE (Feb. 19, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/02/19/bank-
boards-what-has-changed-since-the-financial-crisis/ [https://perma.cc/DJ7R-NSEU]. 
 4. See Eleanor Bloxham, Here’s How Wells Fargo’s Board of Directors Just 
Failed Customers, FORTUNE (Apr. 14, 2017), https://fortune.com/2017/04/14/wells-
fargo-fake-accounts-2/ [perma.cc/E3KM-3ACY]; Matt Egan, Wells Fargo Scandal: 
Where Was the Board?, CNN BUS. (Apr. 24, 2017), https://money.cnn.com/ 
2017/04/24/investing/wells-fargo-scandal-board-annual-meeting/index.html 
[perma.cc/L6YZ-YQLR]. 
 5. Caitlin Flanagan, Matt Lauer’s Woman Problem, THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 5, 
2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/11/lauer-had-a-problem-
with-women/601405/ [perma.cc/M2MU-46MC]. 
 6. Harvey Weinstein Timeline: How the Scandal Unfolded, BBC NEWS (May 29, 
2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-41594672 [perma.cc/ 
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tests at Volkswagen (VW),7 the ignition switch scandal at General 
Motors (GM),8 the explosion in the Massey Energy coal mine,9 and 
the Deep Water Horizon oil rig blowup.10 Presumably, all these 
scandals were the result of either outright fraud or reckless and 
wanton disregard for safety. 
Some of the warning signs for these scandals appear to have 
been dismissed by boards. For example, the Weinstein Company’s 
board did not take corrective action when it became aware of 
Harvey Weinstein’s settlements for multiple claims of sexual 
misconduct.11 And NBCUniversal allegedly ignored sexual 
harassment at the company for years before Matt Lauer was fired.12 
The warning signs for other scandals, such as GM’s ignition switch 
scandal13 or the cheating on emissions tests at VW,14 may not have 
risen to the level of the boards. Whether the boards’ failures were 
disregarding facts, or willfully failing to seek them out, all these 
scandals demonstrate that the board was unable to fulfill its 
gatekeeping function—a function vital to corporate governance.15 
 
A3RK-9VDP]. 
 7. Russell Hotten, Volkswagen: The Scandal Explained, BBC NEWS (Dec. 10, 
2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-34324772 [perma.cc/E72P-WR25]. 
 8. Tanya Basu, Timeline: A History of GM’s Ignition Switch Defect, NPR (Mar. 
31, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/31/297158876/timeline-a-history-of-gms-
ignition-switch-defect [perma.cc/K8DW-AEA2]. 
 9. Sabrina Tavernise, Report Faults Mine Owner for Explosion that Killed 29, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/20/us/20mine.html 
[perma.cc/2H3B-AXAX]. 
 10. Jie Jenny Zou, 8 Years After Deepwater Horizon Explosion, Is Another 
Disaster Waiting to Happen?, NPR (Apr. 20, 2018), https://www.npr.org/ 
2018/04/20/603669896/8-years-after-deepwater-horizon-explosion-is-another-
disaster-waiting-to-happen [perma.cc/XC9W-6557]. 
 11. See Dacher Keltner, Sex, Power, and the Systems that Enable Men Like 
Harvey Weinstein, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/10/sex-
power-and-the-systems-that-enable-men-like-harvey-weinstein [perma.cc/8ZRK-
6EZM]. 
 12. See Patrick Ryan, Ronan Farrow Says NBC’s Alleged Cover-up of Sexual 
Misconduct Is ‘Bigger’ than Matt Lauer, USA TODAY (Oct. 14, 2019), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/entertainment/books/2019/10/14/ronan-farrow-
new-book-catch-and-kill-alleged-cover-up-harvey-weinstein-matt-
lauer/3948761002/ [perma.cc/KUQ3-56UN] (citing RONAN FARROW, CATCH AND 
KILL: LIES, SPIES, AND A CONSPIRACY TO PROTECT PREDATORS (2019)) (“NBC 
brokered nondisclosure agreements and seven-figure payouts with at least seven 
women who alleged sexual harassment or discrimination at the company.”). 
 13. See Basu, supra note 8. 
 14. See Hotten, supra note 7. 
 15. See S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Elusive 
Monitoring Function of Independent Directors, 21 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 235, 285 (2018) 
[hereinafter Avci et al., Elusive Monitoring Function] (critiquing the independent 
directors’ role of “gatekeepers” in corporate law); see also Coffee, supra note 1, at 302 
(defining “gatekeepers” as “independent professionals who pledge their reputational 
capital” and describing their traditional role in securities markets as “protect[ing] 
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Board diversity may help mitigate this problem. Although 
progress is being made, corporate gatekeepers are still not diverse. 
For example, women are struggling to reach business leadership 
positions in the United States. The U.S. ranks fifty-third in the 
World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Index, with 21.7% 
female board members.16 Though this percentage is low relative to 
the female population, women are increasingly filling open board 
seats.17 In 2019, women filled 45% of open board seats at Russell 
3000 companies compared to only 12% in 2008.18 And in July 2019, 
the last all-male board in the S&P 500 added a female 
representative.19 Lawmakers20 and investors21 are pressuring 
companies to increase gender diversity on boards. Women of color, 
however, only held 4.6% of Fortune 500 board seats in 2018,22 and 
ethnic minorities only filled 15% of open board seats in 2019 (and 
held 10% of total board seats). This disparity indicates there has 
been less progress with ethnic diversity.23 
To address these deficiencies in corporate governance and 
board diversity, this paper is organized as follows. Part I explains 
three limitations on the effectiveness of independent board 
 
the interests of dispersed investors who cannot easily take collective action”). 
 16. WORLD ECON. F., GLOBAL GENDER GAP REPORT 2020 11, 32–33 (2020), 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GGGR_2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7Y27-
WL9A] (noting that the wage gap, rather than workforce participation, was the main 
reason the U.S. was not ranked higher). 
 17. See Subodh Mishra, U.S. Board Diversity Trends in 2019, HARV. L. SCH. F. 
ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 18, 2019), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2019/06/18/ 
u-s-board-diversity-trends-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/AMZ5-6RGW] (summarizing 
the results of Institutional Shareholder Services’ diversity profile of Russell 3000 
companies from 2008 to 2019). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Vanessa Fuhrmans, The Last All-Male Board on the S&P 500 Is No Longer, 
WALL ST. J. (July 24, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-last-all-male-board-on-
the-s-p-500-is-no-longer-11564003203 [https://perma.cc/4ZC5-NDPB]. 
 20. CAL. CORP. CODE § 301.3 (requiring public companies headquartered in 
California to have one or more female directors, depending on the size of their board). 
 21. E.g., Joann S. Lublin & Sarah Krouse, State Street to Start Voting Against 
Companies that Don’t Have Women Directors, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 7, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/state-street-says-it-will-start-voting-against-
companies-that-dont-have-women-directors-1488862863 [https://perma.cc/DMV8-
CRL5] (“[State Street Global Advisors] says it will vote against board members 
charged with nominating new directors if they don’t soon make strides at adding 
women.”). 
 22. DELOITTE, MISSING PIECES REPORT: THE 2018 BOARD DIVERSITY CENSUS OF 
WOMEN AND MINORITIES ON FORTUNE 500 BOARDS 17 (2018), 
https://www.catalyst.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/missing_pieces_report_ 
01152019_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK2J-PTHE] (analyzing diversity trends of 
Fortune 500 companies from 2010 to 2018). Women and minorities held 22.5% and 
16.1% of total Fortune 500 board seats in 2018, respectively. Id. 
 23. See Mishra, supra note 17. 
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members in monitoring management. Part II proposes that board 
diversity may mitigate these problems with outside directors and 
uses research on gender diversity to argue this point, while 
acknowledging cultural barriers. Part III introduces proposals from 
corporate law lecturer, Professor Akshaya Kamalnath, for 
improving the board’s access to information and diversity. This Part 
further argues that once women are hired, companies need 
programs to support their development to maximize the benefits of 
diversity. Concluding remarks follow. 
I. The Difficult Role of Outside Directors 
Corporate law relies upon outside directors to monitor 
management.24 Relying on outside directors, however, may not be 
as robust a solution as was once thought.25 The following sections 
explain how outside directors are sometimes (A) not fully informed, 
(B) not fully independent, or (C) potentially complicit in some 
fraudulent schemes. 
A. Outside Directors: Not Fully Informed 
Currently, the corporate community expects independent 
board members to monitor management.26 But in reality, this 
expectation may not be fair. Although U.S. corporate law values the 
independence of outside directors,27 independence, almost by 
 
 24. James Chen, Outside Director, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 18, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/o/outsidedirector.asp [https://perma.cc/N7AK-
LSHQ] (“An outside director is a member of a company’s board of directors who is 
not an employee or stakeholder in the company.”). 
 25. James D. Cox, Managing and Monitoring Conflicts of Interest: Empowering 
the Outside Directors with Independent Counsel, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1077, 1078 (2003) 
(“[I]s the independent director up to the challenges that our expectations have placed 
before the director?”); see also Lisa M. Fairfax, The Uneasy Case for the Inside 
Director, 96 IOWA L. REV. 127, 130–32 (2010) (arguing that the value of independent 
directors “has been vastly overstated” and perhaps the solution lies with inside 
directors, instead). 
 26. Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate 
Governance: How Wise Is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1864 (2007) 
(commenting that a “near consensus” has risen in the global community that 
increased independence of directors more effectively monitors management); see also 
Avci et al., Illusive Monitoring Function, supra note 15, at 285 (noting corporate law 
requires independent directors to protect the company from executive fraud); Sanjai 
Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition 
and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. L. 921, 921 (1999) (observing the trend toward board 
independence back in 1999). 
 27. See Lucian Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Independent Directors and 
Controlling Shareholders, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1271, 1280–81 (2017) (observing that 
“[i]ndependent directors are an important feature of U.S. boardrooms” and have been 
encouraged by both the judiciary and by federal law); see also A.C. Pritchard, 
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definition, means that board members are not fully informed. 
Outside directors are not involved in the day-to-day operations of 
the firm.28 The best they can do is gather reasonably available 
information.29 Yet it is the C-Suite,30 comprised of the same 
individuals whom directors are tasked with monitoring, that 
decides which information to disclose.31 This conflict complicates 
independent board members’ quests to gather information. If C-
Suite executives are planning a get-rich-quick scheme, they can 
easily hide it from outside directors. Even the most diligent, hard-
working board may not receive the information necessary to 
uncover intentional wrongdoing. Additionally, boards typically 
meet only a few times per year and outside directors are normally 
busy running other companies.32 Therefore, even the most well-
intentioned board member may not have the bandwidth to 
effectively monitor management. 
 
Monitoring of Corporate Groups by Independent Directors, 9 J. KOREAN L. 1, 1–2 
(2009) (noting that U.S. corporate law has long-valued director independence). 
 28. Cox, supra note 25, at 1082–83 (arguing that because of their lack of 
involvement in the company’s regular activities, they often have inadequate 
information); Fairfax, supra note 25, at 161 (citing Cox’s reasoning that independent 
directors lack access to adequate information as a reason why outsiders may fail to 
adequately monitor management). 
 29. See Fairfax, supra note 25, at 161–62 (commenting that outsiders often turn 
to “advisors, attorneys, and accountants” for gathering information, but, even so, 
these advisors are unlikely to be purely objective). 
 30.  The term “C-Suite” describes the top level of executive corporate managers, 
often with titles starting with C, such as the CEO (Chief Executive Officer), CFO 
(Chief Financial Officer), or COO (Chief Operating Officer). See Andrew Blumenthal, 
C-Suite, INVESTOPEDIA (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/c-
suite.asp [https://perma.cc/NBF4-ZJU5]. 
 31. See Fairfax, supra note 25, at 161 (noting that because independent directors 
rely on insiders for information, it is difficult for them to assess whether the 
information they receive is accurate); see also Renée B. Adams, Benjamin E. 
Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Role of Boards of Directors in Corporate 
Governance: A Conceptual Framework and Survey, 48 J. ECON. LITERATURE 58, 65 
(2010) (observing that boards have become reliant on auditors and regulators to 
discover managerial misconduct). 
 32. Michal Barzuza & Quinn Curtis, Board Interlocks and Corporate 
Governance, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 669, 691 (2015) (“Sitting on many boards could also 
result in directors who are so busy that they cannot give sufficient attention to any 
given firm. At a certain point, board members might be too busy to conduct their 
monitoring role diligently and effectively.”); Jeremy C. Kress, Board to Death: How 
Busy Directors Could Cause the Next Financial Crisis, 59 B.C. L. REV. 877, 880 (2018) 
(“America’s boardrooms are filled with directors who . . . serve as board members or 
executives of other firms . . . . [O]ther board seats and outside employment limit a 
director’s availability, contribute to cognitive overload, and thereby diminish the 
director’s effectiveness.”); see also SPENCER STUART, 2017 SPENCER STUART U.S. 
BOARD INDEX 18 (2017), https://www.spencerstuart.com/~/media/ssbi2017/ 
ssbi_2017_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/S376-53GC] (finding that on average, S&P 500 
independent board members sit on the board of two public companies). 
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B. Outside Directors: Not Fully Independent 
Not only are outside directors likely not fully informed, they 
may also not be fully independent. That is, even outside board 
members may be “captured” by the CEO and other executives.33 
This capture may occur when board members and executives 
inhabit the same social circles, operate in the same professional 
networks, or are otherwise friends.34 These relationships suggest a 
lack of objectivity and may prevent board members from 
questioning managements’ strategies and decisions. For instance, 
in the options backdating scandal at Comverse Technology, Inc. in 
2006, the board unwittingly approved stock options for fictitious 
employees at management’s direction.35  The board even granted an 
option to an employee named “I. M. Fanton.”36 That was hardly an 
inconspicuous moniker for a phantom employee, but not one board 
member apparently saw any grounds for suspicion.37 
C. Outside Directors and Complicity 
In addition to lacking the full independence necessary for 
genuine oversight of executive decisions, outside directors may 
become complicit in wrongdoing. Complicity is especially tempting 
when there is significant money on the table and no real fear of 
getting caught. Empirical studies have shown that not only do some 
 
 33. JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES 
BROKEN 57 (2008) (“The problem with boards is their unique susceptibility to capture 
by the managers they are supposed to monitor.”); Kobi Kastiel & Yaron Nili, 
“Captured Boards”: The Rise of “Super Directors” and the Case for a Board Suite, 19 
WIS. L. REV. 19, 27–30 (observing that the reliance of outside directors on 
management for information and their limited firm-specific knowledge reduces the 
chance they are independent); Kress, supra note 32, at 883–84 (observing that boards 
form close relationships to management and become emotionally invested in 
management’s success, making them ineffective monitors). 
 34. See Vikramaditya Khanna, E. Han Kim & Yao Lu, CEO Connectedness and 
Corporate Fraud, 70 J. FIN. 1203, 1242–43 (2015) (explaining that board members 
can be connected to CEOs through “common network ties”). 
 35. Litigation Release No. 21090, SEC, SEC Sues Comverse Technology, Inc. for 
Fraudulent Options Backdating and Earnings Management Schemes (June 18, 
2009), https://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2009/lr21090.htm [https://perma.cc/ 
BF47-LC9K]; M. P. Narayanan, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, The Economic 
Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1597, 1610–11 
(2007) (“The executives purportedly went so far as to create a so-called ‘slush fund’ 
of backdated options in the names of fictitious employees, hidden from the company’s 
auditors.”). 
 36. See Tim Annett, Ghost Story, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 9, 2006), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB115514263305431169 [https://perma.cc/SNB5-
4ZST]. 
 37. See Litigation Release No. 21090, supra note 35; see also Annett, supra note 
36 (explaining that the fake names were gradually intermingled with actual 
employees to snooker the directors into approving them). 
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outside directors fail to exercise sufficient checks on the behavior of 
executives, they may also succumb to the temptation to join in 
malfeasance. For example, a study examining manipulation of the 
timing of granting stock options to outside directors analyzed the 
profits made by outside directors who controlled that timing.38 The 
study found that the profits made were strongly suggestive of the 
directors’ complicity in the manipulation of stock options to assure 
that the options were in the money.39 Another study similarly found 
directors were “lucky” in their receipt of stock option grants.40 
Lucky directors are those who receive “lucky grants,” which are 
grants given at the lowest price in a given grant month.41 The 
researchers found that lucky grants were not given to executives or 
independent directors as a result of routine corporate activity.42 
Instead, they found that these lucky grants were likely deliberately 
given to executives and directors to increase their profits.43 That is, 
grants were awarded to directors at the lowest price of the month 
apparently due to backdating or the knowledge of future stock 
appreciation.44 Therefore, so-called “lucky directors” may have 
profited from illicit behavior rather than  luck.45 Perhaps even 
worse, there is evidence that boards may have been complicit in 
manipulating the disclosure of information to the market.46 This 
 
 38. See Avci et al., Independent Directors, supra note 1. 
 39. Id. The term “in the money” means “an option that possesses intrinsic value” 
where that value is more favorable compared “to the prevailing market price of the 
underlying asset.” Cory Mitchell, In the Money (ITM), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 7, 2020), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/inthemoney.asp [https://perma.cc/C48B-
XRGA]. 
 40. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Yaniv Grinstein & Urs Peyer, Lucky CEOs and 
Lucky Directors, 65 J. FIN. 2363 (2010) (observing the opportunistically timed stock 
option grants given to executives and outside directors). 
 41. Id. at 2368. 
 42. Id. at 2364–65. 
 43. Id. at 2364. 
 44. See id. at 2382 (“Although we do not know for certain which lucky grants 
were produced by backdating, we identify a pool of grants—those awarded at the 
lowest price of the month—in which a large fraction was likely produced by 
opportunistic timing.”). 
 45. Id. at 2399 (“We show that the grants awarded to independent directors, who 
are charged with overseeing the company’s executives, were themselves affected by 
opportunistic timing. The timing of director grants was not merely a byproduct of 
the directors being simultaneously awarded grants with executives or of firms 
routinely timing grants to all recipients.”). 
 46. See S. Burcu Avci, Cindy A. Schipani & H. Nejat Seyhun, Ending Executive 
Manipulations of Incentive Compensation, 42 J. CORP. L. 277, 285–88 (2016) 
[hereinafter Avci et al., Executive Manipulations] (citing Robert M. Daines et al., 
Right on Schedule: CEO Option Grants and Opportunism 2 (Stan. U. & BYU, 
Working Paper No. 3314, 2015)) (“To reduce the risk of this type of distortion, 
scholars have suggested that boards and analysts stay aware of the incentives 
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manipulation occurs by either “spring-loading” (delaying disclosure 
of positive news until after the option grant date, so that the option 
will be in the money), or “bullet-dodging” (expediting disclosure of 
negative news before the option grant date, lowering the strike price 
of the option).47 Unfortunately, as these and other studies48 suggest, 
not all directors are immune from the temptation to make easy 
money. 
Thus, not only may some outside board members fail at the 
monitoring function, they may be tempted to engage in illegal 
behavior themselves. At the same time, simply changing the law to 
strengthen the board’s monitoring function is not without its 
downsides. For example, as board members monitor more, 
executives may reveal less to them.49 That is, improving board 
monitoring may sow distrust between the board and executives.50 
Any solution aimed at improving board monitoring must therefore 
also improve the trust between the board and company executives. 
In other words, a solution must focus on the functions of board 
members as well as the culture of the company they are monitoring. 
II. The Potential of Diversity to Improve Board 
Functioning 
Increasing the diversity of board membership may help 
address the aforementioned problems created by uninformed, not 
fully independent, or complicit outside directors on boards who fail 
to properly monitor executives. Akshaya Kamalnath’s research and 
 
established by scheduled options and closely monitor disclosures.”). 
 47. Avci et al., Executive Manipulations, supra note 46, at 286. 
 48. See, e.g., Daniel W. Collins, Guojin Gong & Haidan Li, Corporate Governance 
and Backdating of Executive Stock Options, 26 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 403, 404 
(2009) (“[I]nterlocking boards are at least partially responsible for spreading the 
backdating practice across firms.”); see also Narayanan et al., supra note 35 at 1614–
15 (noting that directors may violate federal securities law if they recklessly 
disregard “red flags” in executives’ representations regarding stock option grants). 
 49. See Donald C. Langevoort, The Human Nature of Corporate Boards: Law, 
Norms, and the Unintended Consequences of Independence and Accountability, 89 
GEO. L.J. 797, 813 (2001) (noting that CEOs may trust outside directors less and 
thus reveal less information to them); see also Bebchuk, supra note 27, at 1312 
(“Having [independent directors] . . . would interfere with board cohesiveness and 
undermine the trust between the board and corporate insiders . . . .”). 
 50. Marleen A. O’Connor, The Enron Board: The Perils of Groupthink, 71 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1233, 1310 (2003) (“[C]orporate governance scholars have cautioned that too 
many independent directors on a board may weaken the trust needed among the 
CEO and board members . . . .”); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway, Sex, Trust, and 
Corporate Boards, 18 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 173, 174–75 (2007) (commenting on 
how independent directors may distrust C-Suite executives even if the CEO helped 
choose them). 
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the studies on gender diversity discussed below support this 
proposition. 
A. Kamalnath’s Proposal 
Kamalnath suggests improving the monitoring function of the 
board through diversity. Proposing a way to achieve that 
diversity,51 she hypothesizes that improving the diversity of each 
board’s membership will increase the expression of nonconforming 
opinions, which will improve the board’s monitoring of 
management.52 
Turning to the example of gender to evaluate Kamalnath’s 
proposal, there are numerous studies supporting the theory that 
gender diversity improves firm performance.53 For example, the 
National Center for Women and Technology found that companies 
with women on their boards outperformed companies with all-male 
boards in a variety of industries.54 This trend was first observed 
after the 2008 global economic crash, suggesting that gender 
diversity might matter even more in a struggling economy and that 
gender diversity on a board may decrease the company’s volatility.55 
Research like this has led Christine Lagarde of the International 
 
 51. Akshaya Kamalnath, Strengthening Boards through Diversity: A Two-Sided 
Market that Can Be Effectively Serviced by Intermediaries, 40 LAW & INEQ. 
(forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 1) (on file with Minnesota Journal Law & 
Inequality). 
 52. See id. (manuscript at 11) (“[D]iverse candidates are likely to come from 
different social circles and hence will not hesitate to question management.”); AARON 
A. DHIR, CHALLENGING BOARDROOM HOMOGENEITY 15 (2015). 
 53. E.g., LOIS JOY, NANCY M. CARTER, HARVEY M. WAGNER & SRIRAM 
NARAYANAN, CATALYST, THE BOTTOM LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND 
WOMEN’S REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS (2007), https://www.catalyst.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/The_Bottom_Line_Corporate_Performance_and_Womens_
Representation_on_Boards.pdf [perma.cc/EPJ2-WKRT] (finding that Fortune 500 
boards with more women enjoy better returns on equity, sales, and invested capital); 
see also FRANCESCA LAGERBERG, GRANT THORNTON, WOMEN IN BUSINESS: THE 
VALUE OF DIVERSITY 3 (2015), https://www.grantthornton.global/globalassets/ 
wib_value_of_diversity.pdf [perma.cc/M3DM-BP4N] (discovering that in the U.S., 
boards with both genders represented have an almost 2% greater return on assets 
than male-only boards); see also Tim Smedley, Diversity at the Top Pays Dividends, 
FIN. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2016) (quoting Marcus Noland, Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ.), 
https://www.ft.com/content/82a3aee2-d97d-11e5-a72f-1e7744c66818 
[perma.cc/JT4Z-QGQW] (“[F]irms with more women can expect a 6 percentage point 
increase in net profit.”). 
 54. LECIA BARKER, CYNTHIA MANCHA & CATHERINE ASHCRAFT, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
WOMEN & INFO. TECH., WHAT IS THE IMPACT OF GENDER DIVERSITY ON TECHNOLOGY 
BUSINESS PERFORMANCE? RESEARCH SUMMARY 3 (2014), https://www.ncwit.org/ 
sites/default/files/resources/impactgenderdiversitytechbusinessperformance_print.p
df [perma.cc/N66C-CYBD] (“Gender-diverse management teams showed superior 
return on equity, debt/equity ratios, price/equity ratios, and average growth.”). 
 55. Id. 
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Monetary Fund, then the organization’s managing director, to 
comment: “[I]f it had been the Lehman Sisters rather than the 
Lehman Brothers, the world might well look a lot different today.”56 
Additionally, research has suggested that companies with more 
female board members may be more proactive about corporate 
social responsibility issues.57 Indeed, diverse inputs may lead to 
innovation as more perspectives bring more to the table.58 Yet 
increasing board member diversity can be challenging: diverse 
members may be unsure when to speak up, and they may be less 
likely to be heard when they do.59 
B. Difficulties for Women on Boards 
The hypothesis that diverse boards may lead to better 
monitoring is supported by a study conducted by Michael McDonald 
and James Westphal.60 This study focused on the diversity of 
incoming board members and their access to mentoring.61 The 
researchers suggest that the board benefits from diversity on the 
board, but also found that women were not being mentored, which 
inhibited their advancement.62 That is, according to the study, 
newly appointed male board members received informal mentoring 
 
 56. See Christine Lagarde, Ten Years After Lehman – Lessons Learned and 
Challenges Ahead, IMFBLOG (Sept. 5, 2018), https://blogs.imf.org/2018/09/05/ten-
years-after-lehman-lessons-learned-and-challenges-ahead/ [perma.cc/7VAY-NG4A]. 
 57. Eunjung Hyun, Daegyu Yang, Hojin Jung & Kihoon Hong, Women on Boards 
and Corporate Social Responsibility, SUSTAINABILITY, Apr. 2016, at 1, 2 (2016) 
(noting that women are more likely to speak up about corporate social responsibility 
issues for reputational reasons, or because they may be more morally oriented 
towards social responsibility). 
 58. See Stephen Turban, Dan Wu & Letian Zhang, Research: When Gender 
Diversity Makes Firms More Productive, HARV. BUS. REV. (Feb. 11, 2019), 
https://hbr.org/2019/02/research-when-gender-diversity-makes-firms-more-
productive [perma.cc/2WEJ-K4QC] (“Significant research has shown that diverse 
teams can develop more innovative ideas.”). 
 59. See Michael McDonald & James Westphal, Access Denied: Low Mentoring of 
Women and Minority First-Time Directors and Its Negative Effects on Appointments 
to Additional Boards, 56 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1169, 1173–74 (2013) (arguing that because 
women do not receive the mentoring opportunities that men do, they are not as aware 
of when to speak up or not in the professional setting); see also Susan Chira, The 
Universal Phenomenon of Men Interrupting Women, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/business/women-sexism-work-huffington-
kamala-harris.html [perma.cc/QD87-VPSX] (observing that women are often 
interrupted or decide not to speak when outnumbered by men). 
 60. See McDonald & Westphal, supra note 59. 
 61. Id. at 1169. 
 62. See id. (citing Renee B. Adams & Daniel Ferreira, Women in the Boardroom 
and Their Impact on Governance and Performance, 94 J. FIN. ECON. 291 (2009)) 
(“[D]emographic minority directors may be, at least in some respects, more 
conscientious in executing their director roles and may be more independent from 
management.”). 
2021] Improving Board Decisions 305 
about board culture, such as raising issues to management before 
formal board meetings rather than during meetings,63 whereas 
newly appointed women did not. This mentorship inequity in turn 
resulted in women speaking up more often than men in meetings64 
and consequently, not being selected for other board positions 
because they were perceived as less savvy in navigating their roles, 
thus hurting women’s future career opportunities.65 
The findings from McDonald and Westphal’s study raise 
several questions: First, why are women not receiving the informal 
mentoring that men receive? Second, why are women’s careers 
harmed for speaking up and doing their job? And third, why are 
men, who typically receive more mentoring, not being mentored to 
ask more questions and to take their monitoring role more 
seriously? These concerns demonstrate the need to change the 
prevailing culture of boards. Board members should be applauded, 
not penalized, for speaking up, asking questions, and seeking 
information.  A board’s culture should allow questions to be openly 
asked and answered, regardless of who is asking the questions. 
When corporate culture punishes women for speaking up, it 
follows that women may be reluctant to speak up in the future. This 
reluctance not only hurts the company, as potential company 
improvements are ignored,66 but also harms the silenced 
individuals.67 Employees who feel their voices are not heard may 
 
 63. Id. at 1173–76 (finding that mentoring for first-time directors is important 
for them to win support in the boardroom). 
 64. Id. at 1182 (“[F]irst-time directors who are racial minorities or women receive 
significantly lower levels of participation process mentoring than first-time directors 
who are white males.”). 
 65. See id. at 1174, 1197 (stating that a first-time director’s failure to understand 
board norms, including the appropriate venues to raise concerns and questions about 
strategy and policy issues, will ultimately hinder their ability to receive further 
board appointments). 
 66. See Cindy A. Schipani, Frances J. Milliken & Terry M. Dworkin, The Impact 
of Employment Law and Practices on Business and Society: The Significance of 
Worker Voice, 19 PA. J. BUS. L. 979, 985 (2017) [hereinafter Schipani et al., 
Significance of Worker Voice] (“An employee is therefore more likely to engage in 
voice behaviors to the extent that she has a strong desire or sense of obligation to 
help the organization operate more effectively . . . .”); see also Linn Van Dyne & 
Jeffrey LePine, Helping and Voice Extra-role Behaviors: Evidence of Construct and 
Predictive Validity, 41 ACAD. MGMT. J. 108, 109 (1998) (“[V]oice [is] promotive 
behavior that emphasizes expression of constructive challenge intended to improve 
rather than merely criticize.”). 
 67. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JOEL ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT 113 (1999) 
(noting that employees themselves believe their work would improve if they had a 
greater voice in the company); see also Matthew T. Bodie, Miriam A. Cherry, Marcia 
L. McCormick & Jintong Tang,  The Law and Policy of People Analytics, 88 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 961, 1019 (2017) (“Diverse employees often feel pressure to mute some aspect 
of their identity to fit into their workplace culture.”); see also Stephen Befort, A New 
306 Law & Inequality [Vol. 39: 2 
face more stress because they feel less in control of their work 
environment.68 Research has shown that workplace stress has 
many negative effects. For example, higher stress is correlated with 
employees skipping work more often.69 Stress can also lead to 
physical ailments or aggravate pre-existing health conditions.70 
Put more positively, speaking up may help at both an 
individual and an organizational level. When able to speak up and 
feel heard, employees are more likely to have better attitudes 
toward their duties.71 They are also likely to think more highly of 
the company for which they work.72 On an organizational level, 
happier employees may be more committed to improving their 
company.73 Although these studies demonstrate the positive effects 
that speaking up has on employees, board members may also 
experience these same effects. 
 
Voice for the Workplace: A Proposal for an American Works Councils Act, 69 MO. L. 
REV. 607, 611–12 (2004) (discussing how employees with stronger voices in the 
company are more likely to be satisfied, loyal, and stay with the company longer). 
 68. See E.W. Morrison & F.J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to 
Change and Development in a Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 706, 721 
(2000) (stating that employees might use destructive means to establish control if 
constructive means are unavailable); see also Schipani et al., Significance of Worker 
Voice, supra note 66, at 986 (“[T]he suppression of voice behaviors and the perceived 
lack of voice opportunities can create feelings of stress . . . .”). 
 69. Thomas W. Colligan & Eileen M. Higgins, Workplace Stress: Etiology & 
Consequences, 21 J. WORKPLACE BEHAV. HEALTH 89, 93 (2006) (“Workplace stress 
has been shown to . . . increase absenteeism . . . .”); Schipani et al., Significance of 
Worker Voice, supra note 66, at 990–91 (observing the psychological and physical 
health effects of when employees’ voices are not heard in their companies). 
 70. See Colligan & Higgins, supra note 69, at 91–92 (describing a typical physical 
response to chronic stress); Schipani et al., Significance of Worker Voice, supra note 
66 (“Stress-induced medical conditions include bodily pains, dizziness, headaches, 
heart disease, asthma, and hypertension.”). 
 71. See Michael Bashshur & Burak Oc, When Voice Matters: A Multilevel Review 
of the Impact of Voice in Organizations, 41 J. MGMT. 1530, 1535–36 (2015) (noting a 
positive relationship between employee voice and job satisfaction in multiple 
studies); see also Schipani et al., Significance of Worker Voice, supra note 66, at 988 
(“[E]mployees who perceive that they have input into procedures and outcomes are 
likely to view such procedures and outcomes as fairer.”). 
 72. See Bashshur & Oc, supra note 71, at 1536 (observing a positive relationship 
between employee voice opportunities and trust in authority); see also Schipani et 
al., Significance of Worker Voice, supra note 66, at 988 (“[Employees] may also feel 
more like valued members of the organization if they perceive that they are treated 
fairly at the workplace.”). 
 73. See Schipani et al., Significance of Worker Voice, supra note 66, at 989–90 
(observing that when employees have the opportunity to speak, they feel more 
committed to their companies); see also Naz Beheshti, 10 Timely Statistics About the 
Connection Between Employee Engagement and Wellness, FORBES (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nazbeheshti/2019/01/16/10-timely-statistics-about-the-
connection-between-employee-engagement-and-wellness/?sh=5d7bd35a22a0 
[perma.cc/EPJ2-WKRT] (“Employees who feel their voice is heard are 4.6 times more 
likely to feel empowered to perform their best work.”). 
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Not only is it important for board members to raise their 
voices, but if their voices are diverse (as Kamalnath proposes),74 
boards may be more likely to find innovative solutions to problems. 
Studies have shown that diversity in multiple characteristics, such 
as “age, nationality, gender, [and] racial diversity” can all help 
increase innovation,75 encouraging the company to consider doing 
things differently.76 Therefore, companies with more diverse boards 
may be less likely to get stuck in practices that do not improve 
company performance.77 In addition to making companies more 
adaptable, board diversity may also increase innovation through 
widening a company’s “knowledge base.”78 Furthermore, a diverse 
board may help executives understand the market from a more 
holistic perspective as the board members would represent a 
broader range of constituents.79 
III.  Potential Solutions to Improve Board Monitoring 
This Part discusses Kamalnath’s proposal to improve the 
board’s monitoring of management, which includes (1) inviting 
board members to attend management meetings and (2) 
empowering third parties to recruit diverse board candidates.80 It 
also argues that mentorship and sponsorship programs are 
important to the advancement of new, diverse employees and board 
members. 
 
 74. Kamalnath, supra note 51 (manuscript at 3) (suggesting that increasing 
board diversity will improve its monitoring of management). 
 75. Fabrice Galia & Emmanuel Zenou, Board Composition and Forms of 
Innovation: Does Diversity Make a Difference? (June 27, 2016) (manuscript at 1, 3) 
(published in 6 EUR. J. INT’L MGMT. 630 (2012)); see also Donald C. Hambrick & 
Phyllis A. Mason, Upper Echelons: The Organization as a Reflection of Its Top 
Managers, 9 ACAD.  MGMT. REV. 193, 202 (1984) (“[N]ovel problem solving is best 
handled by a heterogenous group in which diversity of opinion, knowledge, and 
background allows a thorough airing of alternatives.”). 
 76. See Christian R. Østergaard, Bram Timmermans & Kari Kristinsson, Does a 
Different View Create Something New? The Effect of Employee Diversity on 
Innovation, 40 RSCH. POL’Y 500, 500 (2011) (“Employee diversity . . . make[s] the 
firm more open towards new ideas and more creative.”). 
 77. See id. 
 78. Id. (noting that more diversity increases a firm’s knowledge base, which in 
turn creates more opportunities for innovation). 
 79. See Galia & Zenou, supra note 75 (manuscript at 2) (“According to many 
studies . . . diversity provides the firm with several advantages such as greater 
creativity, better understanding of the market, effective problem solving and 
enhanced capability.”). 
 80. See Kamalnath, supra note 51 (manuscript at 6, 15). 
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A. Kamalnath’s Proposals 
Kamalnath suggests there are several ways to create more 
diverse boards that can effectively monitor management. 
i. Include Board Members in Executive Meetings 
In addition to diversity increasing a board’s access to 
information at a company, Kamalnath discusses other potential 
solutions to ensure information is readily available to the board.81 
One such example is the so-called “Netflix model.”82 At Netflix, the 
executives ensure information is accessible to the board by asking 
directors to regularly listen in on management meetings.83 Netflix 
also requires executives to provide the board with detailed memos 
on the corporation’s activities and allows the board to question the 
executives about these memos.84 A board with information on the 
company’s activities readily available—and the ability to question 
it—can create a culture of openness and free thinking between the 
board and management. 
ii. Empower Third Party Intermediaries 
Kamalnath also proposes that third party intermediaries may 
be able to assist in recruiting diverse members to the firm, as well 
as mediate a shift in culture.85 She suggests the market for 
intermediaries is two-sided.86 On one side, third parties can help 
companies find diverse board candidates.87 On the other side, third 
parties can help potential board members assess a company’s 
 
 81. See id. (manuscript at 6–10) (discussing proposals to outsource the board’s 
functions, empower well informed board members, and follow the “Netflix model”). 
 82. Id. (manuscript at 6–7) (describing the “Netflix model” as requiring directors 
to “regularly attend monthly and quarterly senior management meetings” as 
observers and to adopt a “memo-based culture[,]” as opposed to a presentation 
culture). 
 83. See id. (manuscript at 6). 
 84. See id. (“[B]oard communications are ‘structured as approximately 30-page 
online memos in narrative form that not only include links to supporting analysis 
but also allow open access to all data and information on the company’s internal 
shared systems, including the ability to ask clarifying questions of the subject 
authors.’” (quoting David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Netflix Approach to Governance: 
Genuine Transparency with the Board, (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance, Stanford 
Closer Look Ser. No. CGRP71, 2018)). 
 85. See id. (manuscript at 15–17). 
 86. See id. (manuscript at 14) (“[E]xecutive search firms . . . facilitate 
transactions between companies and potential executives.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 87. See id. (manuscript at 14–15) (suggesting that third parties find and vet 
diverse candidates for companies to improve their boards or to minimally signal they 
are socially responsible). 
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culture.88 Because they see both sides of the market, Kamalnath 
notes that third parties can “fill information gaps” between boards 
and potential candidates.89 In turn, she observes that the work of 
third parties shapes “corporate culture generally” through advising 
how to create a more inclusive corporate culture and attracting a 
more diverse pool of individuals for board seats.90 
To further the work of third-party intermediaries, it is 
necessary for executives and board members to fully invest in the 
approach. Otherwise, they could easily shop for an outside opinion 
that blindly praises the board’s functioning. This approach could 
lead to “tick-the-box compliance” instead of critically evaluating the 
board to improve its effectiveness.91 Yet when properly utilized, 
these third parties can help improve a board’s diversity and 
performance. 
B. Mentoring, Sponsoring, and Networking 
Once more diverse candidates are hired into companies—
which, in turn, feed the pipeline for corporate boards—they need 
proper mentoring to succeed. Gender discrimination has been 
illegal for some time,92 so presumably, overt discrimination is not 
the reason why boards have few women members.93 Instead, 
 
 88. See id. (manuscript at 14) (“[D]iverse candidates want to be able to accurately 
assess boards before joining them.”). 
 89. Id. (manuscript at 14–15) (noting that the benefits of using executive search 
firms outweigh the costs). 
 90. Id. (manuscript at 15–16) (“[Executive search firms] work to manage 
unconscious bias . . . .” (internal citations omitted)). 
 91. Id. (manuscript at 17) (citing Luca Enriques & Dirk Zerzsche, Quack 
Corporate Governance, Round III: Bank Board Regulation Under the New European 
Capital Requirement Directive, 16 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 211 (2015)) (observing 
that the European Union’s board evaluation requirements do not lead to meaningful 
board engagement). 
 92. See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); 
Cindy A. Schipani & Terry M. Dworkin, The Need for Mentors in Promoting Gender 
Diverse Leadership in the #MeToo Era, 87 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1272, 1275–80 (2019) 
[hereinafter Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era] (detailing Title VII’s 
protections and other laws that prohibit sexual harassment in the workplace). 
 93. See Cindy A. Schipani, Terry M. Dworkin, Angel Kwolek-Folland & Virginia 
G. Maurer, Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of Organizational Leadership: 
The Significance of Mentoring and Networking, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 89, 
97–98 (2009) (internal citations omitted) (“The more usual forms of discrimination, 
however, are the subtle but clear cultural biases and gender stereotypes in corporate 
decision-making, behavior, and job assignment.”); see also Karen S. Lyness & Donna 
E. Thompson, Above the Glass Ceiling? A Comparison of Matched Samples of Female 
and Male Executives, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 359, 372 (1997) (“[W]omen are more 
likely to be found in jobs that are not comparable to men’s jobs in status, power, or 
advancement potential.”). Subtle discrimination has persisted for decades. See O.C. 
Brenner, Joseph Tomkiewicz & Virginia Ellen Schein, The Relationship Between Sex 
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unconscious biases may be at play as humans tend to value people 
who are similar to them.94 Because men are more often the leaders 
of a company, this norm may result in women often being 
considered outsiders by company leadership.95 Mentoring programs 
may help counter these unconscious biases.96 
Furthermore, mentoring provides many benefits that can turn 
women into insiders. Mentoring, for instance, exposes “both parties 
to the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the other.”97 Mentoring 
may also further the careers of those mentored.98 It helps mentees 
adapt more quickly to the corporate culture and introduces them to 
influential figures within the corporation who could help advance 
their careers.99 Furthermore, employees with informal mentors are 
 
Role Stereotypes and Requisite Management Characteristics Revisited, 32 ACAD. 
MGMT. J. 662, 668 (1989) (noting that although there is an increase in women in 
lower and middle management positions, the attitudes of male managers have not 
changed and impede women from obtaining positions in upper management); see also 
Belle Rose Ragins & Eric Sundstrom, Gender and Power in Organizations: A 
Longitudinal Perspective, 105 PSYCH. BULL. 51, 63 (1989) (noting gender 
stereotyping is one obstacle to female success in the corporate world). 
 94. See Georgia T. Chao & Henry Moon, The Cultural Mosaic: A Metatheory for 
Understanding the Complexity of Culture, 90 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1128, 1135 (2005) 
(describing research on why people prefer to interact with those who are similar to 
them); see also DONN BYRNE, THE ATTRACTION PARADIGM 211 (1971) (discussing the 
similarity-attraction theory, which claims humans gravitate to those with whom we 
are similar); Terry M. Dworkin, Cindy A. Schipani, Frances J. Milliken & Madeline 
K. Kneeland, Assessing the Progress of Women in Corporate America: The More 
Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, 55 AM. BUS. L.J. 721, 725 (2018) 
[hereinafter Dworkin et al., Progress of Women in Corporate America] (“Social-
identity theory . . . posits that individuals attach differing value to various social 
categories and assign more value to those categories with which they personally 
identify.”). 
 95. See Dworkin et al., Progress of Women in Corporate America, supra note 94, 
at 755 (discussing how the perception of women as outsiders makes mentoring 
programs important in elevating women up the corporate ladder). 
 96. See Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1288 
(arguing that mentoring women may help connect them to career opportunities they 
may not otherwise have if male management subconsciously “views them as less 
capable”); see also Terry M. Dworkin, Aarti Ramaswami & Cindy A. Schipani, The 
Role of Networks, Mentors, and the Law in Overcoming Barriers to Organizational 
Leadership for Women with Children, 20 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 83, 115–16 (2013) 
(observing that mentoring may improve the networks of women with dependents). 
 97. Dworkin et al., Progress of Women in Corporate America, supra note 94, at 
755 (continuing on to suggest mentoring will help women “be seen as part of the 
same club as men”). 
 98. See Tammy D. Allen, Lillian T. Eby, Mark L. Poteet & Elizabeth Lentz, 
Career Benefits Associated with Mentoring for Protégés: A Meta-analysis, 89 J. 
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 127 (2004); see also Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo 
Era, supra note 92, at 1287 (stating that mentors support the career development of 
their mentees). 
 99. See Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287 
(citing Allen et al., supra note 98, at 128) (noting how mentoring teaches mentees 
about how an organization functions and helps communicate mentees’ value to 
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more likely to be noticed within a company, as mentors can draw 
the attention of decision makers to their mentees.100 
Not only does mentoring help boost a mentee’s career, it can 
also improve their mental health.101 A mentor can provide their 
mentee with emotional support during stressful moments at 
work.102 Mentees may also turn to their mentors for advice when 
feeling stuck on a project.103 These professional relationships may 
become personal friendships as well.104 On a macro-level, 
mentorship helps the mentee feel connected to and accepted by the 
corporation and that the company believes the mentee is worth its 
investment.105 Mentors also receive positive psychological benefits 
from mentorship, such as feeling appreciated by their coworkers.106 
Sponsorship programs (whether formal or informal) are 
another tool that may help increase the diversity of the workforce—
and thus future diversity on boards. Sponsorship differs from 
mentorship because a mentor shares their institutional knowledge 
with the mentee, while a sponsor uses their influence to help the 
protege rise within a corporation.107 The corporate community often 
prefers mentoring over sponsoring.108 Some companies have 
stopped their formal sponsorship programs because executives felt 
uncomfortable advocating for junior colleagues whom they felt were 
unprepared for promotion.109 Indeed, sponsorship creates higher 
risks for executives as it asks them to put their reputation on the 
 
decision-makers). 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. at 1289 (“Studies have indicated that informal relationships tend to 
be more beneficial both psychosocially and for career development . . . .”). 
 102. See id. at 1287 (quoting Allen et al., supra note 98, at 128) (stating that a 
mentor’s psychosocial function includes “counseling[] and friendship”). 
 103. See id. 
 104. Id. at 1287 (quoting Allen et al., supra note 98, at 128). 
 105. See id. at 1288 (stating that mentoring will help women feel less like 
outsiders in organizations); see also Allen et al., supra note 98, at 128 (stating that 
mentoring includes “psychosocial functions,” one of which is “acceptance”). 
 106. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287 
(quoting Kathy E. Kram, Phases of the Mentor Relationship, 26 ACAD. MGMT. J. 608, 
613–14 (1983)) (“[M]entors, in turn, are benefitted through ‘recognition and respect 
from peers and superiors’ for developing the talent.”). 
 107. Herminia Ibarra, A Lack of Sponsorship is Keeping Women from Advancing 
into Leadership, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 19, 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/08/a-lack-of-
sponsorship-is-keeping-women-from-advancing-into-leadership [https://perma.cc/ 
T6YG-MRQB] (describing the difference between a sponsor and a mentor). 
 108. See id. (“Typically, [organizations] abandon sponsorship because . . . you 
cannot mandate that [senior executives] spend their personal capital advocating for 
people they don’t know well . . . .”). 
 109. Id. 
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line for junior colleagues.110 On the other hand, sponsorship 
provides higher rewards for junior colleagues than mentorship 
does.111 Thus, companies should provide opportunities that 
facilitate informal sponsorship as well as mentorship programs. 
In addition to mentorship and sponsorship, professional 
networking also helps women feel more accepted at work.112 Women 
are often not given control over the most valuable client projects.113 
This exclusion could be because management sees women as less 
competent than their male counterparts or holds women to a higher 
standard when proving their competence.114 Networking may help 
women bring valuable clients to the firm and thus gain ownership 
of important projects.115 Networking may also help debunk 
stereotypes of women being too burdened by marital or familial life 
to fully participate in the organization.116 Furthermore, studies 
have shown that networking can result in a better salary, improved 
career development, and even better job performance 
evaluations.117 
In their above-mentioned study, McDonald and Westphal 
concluded that women were not receiving the same mentoring 
opportunities that men were, and thus, women were offered fewer 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. See id. (“[H]aving a mentor increased the likelihood of promotion two years 
later for men, but had no effect on promotion for women.”). 
 112. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1292–94 
(observing the ways networking can benefit women in the workplace); see also 
Kristen Hicks, Why Professional Networking Groups for Women Remain Valuable, 
FAST COMPANY (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.fastcompany.com/90448654/the-benefits-
of-womens-networking-groups [https://perma.cc/8ACP-WUVN] (“[I]nner [female] 
networks help not just with finding opportunities, but also by exchanging advice 
specific to the unique challenges women face.”). 
 113. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287–88 
(citing Paula Santonocito, Women Pipeline, 27 EMP. ALERT 3, 3 (2010)). 
 114. DEBORAH L. RHODE, ABA COMM’N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, THE 
UNFINISHED AGENDA: WOMEN AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 6 (2001) (stating that 
female attorneys are not presumed to be competent, as men are, and citing studies 
where a majority of women feel they are held to a higher standard); see Schipani & 
Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1288 (stating that gender 
stereotypes can lead to women not being assigned to the company’s most valuable 
clients). 
 115. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1287–88 
(citing Santonocito, supra note 113, at 3) (commenting that not getting more 
“valuable clients” is one obstacle women face in climbing the corporate ladder). 
 116. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1288; see 
also Dworkin et al., Progress of Women in Corporate America, supra note 94. 
 117. Schipani & Dworkin, Mentors in the #MeToo Era, supra note 92, at 1289 
(citing Hans-Georg Wolff & Klaus Moser, Effects of Networking on Career Success: A 
Longitudinal Study, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 196, 196–97, 202 (2009)) (observing the 
benefits networking can have on one’s professional life). 
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opportunities to serve on additional boards.118 Mentoring 
opportunities may help more women attain board positions, with 
the direct effect of creating more gender-diverse boards.119 And, as 
Kamalnath argues, greater board diversity may, in turn, help 
improve the board’s monitoring of management.120 
C. Integrity 
It is also critically important to look for individuals of high 
integrity when appointing C-Suite executives as well as board 
members, and to have internal controls in place so that good people 
are not tempted to do bad things. As previously mentioned, we have 
seen executives perpetrate elaborate and not-so-elaborate schemes 
to hide fraud.121 And in some cases, we have even seen likely 
complicity between management and the directors.122 Integrity in 
both the C-Suite and the boardroom is thus critical. 
D. Applying Equal Standards Across the Board 
Finally, in addition to increasing board diversity, it is also 
important to hold all board members to the same standards. This 
application of equal standards is not necessarily the case today. For 
example, during the ongoing Black Lives Matter movement, 
reporters have observed that, following allegations of gaslighting, 
emotional abuse, or underpaying or ignoring the opinions of people 
of color, female business founders were stepping down from their 
leadership positions more quickly than their male counterparts.123 
 
 118. McDonald & Westphal, supra note 59, at 1174. 
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founders stepped down after allegations of mismanagement, while the press was 
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Robertson, Refinery29 Editor Resigns After Former Employees Describe ‘Toxic 
Culture’, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/08/business/ 
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314 Law & Inequality [Vol. 39: 2 
After employees called out companies for creating toxic 
environments for people of color, the female founders of The 
Wing,124 Man Repeller,125 and Refinery29126 (to name a few) all 
stepped down. These quick departures starkly contrast with how 
long it took the male founders of Uber (Travis Kalanick) and 
WeWork (Adam Neumann) to step down.127 Kalanick allegedly 
created a sexist work culture at Uber, which involved “sexual 
harassment, discrimination and retaliation.”128 Similarly, 
Neumann allegedly smoked marijuana around a pregnant WeWork 
employee, who was demoted after both her pregnancies.129 It took 
years for Kalanick and Neumann’s alleged discriminatory 
behaviors to catch the public’s eye.130 Top management, whether 
male or female, should be held accountable by their board of 
directors. They should not exist in responsibility-free vacuums. 
Instead, the business community should ensure that both male and 
female founders are held to the same standards. 
Conclusion 
We rely on outside directors to play an important monitoring 
role in corporate law.131  Yet their presence on the board is not a 
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panacea.132 Due to their status as outsiders, independent board 
members lack the information necessary to fully understand the 
company’s operations.133 Furthermore, outside directors often are 
not completely independent from management: they move in 
similar social and professional networks, sometimes developing 
personal friendships.134 Without complete information and full 
independence, it is not surprising that the monitoring function of 
the board sometimes fails.135 Kamalnath proposes two solutions to 
this dilemma. First, she suggests that increasing the diversity of 
board members will help improve the board’s monitoring of 
management.136 Second, she recommends both companies and 
potential board candidates interact with third party intermediaries 
to help reduce information gaps between these two sides of the labor 
market.137 
Kamalnath’s proposals are insightful and important steps in 
the right direction. In addition, to maximize the benefits of board 
diversity, corporations must ensure diverse voices are heard and 
valued. Corporations can do this through investing in mentorship 
and sponsorship programs that promote diversity, as well as 
increasing networking opportunities.138 Finally, the board should 
appoint members of high integrity and hold all executives to the 
same standards of behavior. With these changes, future boards may 
be better able to prevent—or at least better positioned to take 
corrective action against—another major corporate scandal.  
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